The interference of intuitive knowledge through dual-process theories

Πρακτικά Εκτεταμένων Συνόψεων Εργασιών
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Published: Sep 21, 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12681/codiste.5424
Athina Karamanidou
University of Western Macedonia
Dimitrios Pnevmatikos
University of Western Macedonia
Abstract

Λέξεις κλειδιά: διαισθητικές γνώσεις, παραγωγικοί συλλογισμοί, εννοιολογική κατανόηση


 


THE INTERFERENCE OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE THROUGH DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES


 


Athina Karamanidou1, Dimitrios Pnevmatikos2


PhD candidate, Department of Primary Education, UOWM, 2Professor, Department of Primary Education, UOWM


[email protected]


 


Abstract


The present study examines the interference of intuitive knowledge on counter-intuitive scientific concepts. Sixth grade students and university students participated in the research. The level of their conceptual understanding was detected through individual interviews, and they were classified into two groups, individuals with an intuitive understanding of the concepts and individuals with a scientific understanding of the concepts. Participants evaluated productive reasoning that contained conflict between scientific and intuitive concept representations. It was found that the intuitive knowledge of the individuals who belonged to both groups intervened when evaluating productive reasoning.

Article Details
  • Section
  • 2. PERCEPTIONS AND REFLECTIONS OF STUDENTS AND TEACHERS
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